Feminist political economists have long pointed to the inherently gendered nature of finance. In the introduction to a recent collection edited by three leading scholars in the field, Brigitte Young, Isabelle Bakker and Diane Elson (2011: 1; see also Bakker 1994) point out that there is a 'strategic silence' about gender perpetuated by central bank governors, finance ministers, and boards of public and private financial institutions, as well as by the economists who advise them (see also Bakker 1994) . The silence reflects a series of assumptions, ranging from the ontological prioritisation of 'rational economic man' or 'homo economicus' (Ferber and Nelson 2003) to assumptions about the supposedly gender-neutral character of financial regulation, and fiscal and monetary policy. The silence about gender is 'strategic' in the sense that it 'obscures the ways in which financial governance interacts with, and reinforces, or restructures, the social organization of gender relations' and masks the ways in which it 'operates to the disadvantage of women and reinforces gender inequality' (Young, Bakker and Elson 2011: 1) .
Our aim in this article is to contribute to the much larger project of rendering visible the gendered nature of finance. The entry point for our contribution is the set of highly gendered narratives that were produced by the UK media, along with a number of bankers and government officials, around the time of the appointment of Mark Carney as Governor of the Bank of England -a post that he took up in July 2013. Our interest in this case study was piqued by a number of news articles that made reference to the charming personality of the 'immaculately groomed new governor' (Giles 2013b ) who supposedly bears a striking similarity to George Clooney. Carney was variously described as a 'matinee idol' with messianic qualities (Brummer 2013 ), a 'rock-star banker' (Stewart 2013) , and a 'hockey-playing, Harvard-and Oxford-educated father of four' (Curtis 2013 ). According to one senior Treasury official, Mark Carney represents 'the perfect
Davos-man' (McElvoy 2013).
This matters because in recent years a significant amount of critical attention has been paid to the ways in which the post-crisis invocation of women as the new saviours of global finance -or the 'Lehman Sisters' narrative, which attributes the crisis to testosterone-driven men behaving badly -both reproduces myths about femininity/masculinity and helps to detract attention from the broader socio-structural causes of financial crises. In a similar vein, we argue in this article that the particular framing of Carney as a sexy and suave central banking superhero who will stimulate the British economy with his 'magical monetary powers' (Freeland 2013) helps to naturalise a particular form of masculinity as key to post-crisis recovery. In so doing, we argue, it reinforces the broader depoliticisation of central banking, which in turn serves to silence and in part reproduce patterns of gender inequality in finance. Our interest, therefore, goes beyond the discursive production of gender and extends to a consideration of some of the ways in which performances of gendered finance are intricately and inseparably bound up with an uneven distribution of power and resources in contemporary society.
We develop this argument in three sections. The first highlights some of the portrayals of Carney in the news media. This not only offers a view into how journalists framed Carney, but given that other bankers and politicians are quoted extensively, it also allows us to see how these actors shared and reproduced these narratives of Carney as well. To be clear, this is not an analysis of the effect of the media on public opinion, but rather an attempt to document and theorise the production of a gendered narrative around Carney. i academics within the fields of masculinity studies and feminist IPE, we find that Carney is depicted as having aspects of both a 'transnational business masculinity' and an older and more traditional 'bourgeois masculinity'. The former has been frequently linked to the 'men behaving badly' narrative of crisis, whereas the latter is seen as key to avoiding the excesses of the former in an historical moment of post-crisis 'recovery'. While we are interested in, and indeed draw upon, some of the literature that systematically collects and compares the professional progression and/or policy decisions of individual central bankers across time and space, such comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, our aim here is twofold. On the one hand, we seek to elucidate the gendered nature of central banking through an analysis of masculinity, which we argue has been naturalised in finance both pre-and post-crisis. On the other hand, we seek to link these gendered discourses to broader processes of depoliticisation.
In order to do so, the second section of the article begins with a survey of the academic literature on the depoliticisation of monetary policy. It then situates the gendered narratives of Carney within three overlapping forms, 'arena-shifting', 'responsibilityshifting' and 'politics-shifting' depoliticisation, arguing that they help to reproduce each kind. These forms are used as a heuristic device to organise our claims about Carney, rather than contribute to debates about monetary policy and depoliticisation per se. That said, our analysis does indicate the ways in which these debates themselves tend to be gender blind, highlighting an additional 'strategic silence' emerging from the literature on central bank depoliticisation itself. Finally, in the third section we focus on the Bank of England's stated primary objectives of monetary and financial stability in order to highlight some of the important political and distributional questions that are silenced by these depoliticising moves. Of course, our focus on Carney's appointment carries with it historical specificities that limit the claims we can generalise about gender and finance.
Yet, situating our analysis within the particulars of the post-crisis British context allows us to explore how the narrative surrounding Carney was able to tap into and contribute to the broader -and deeply problematic -gendered accounts of what went wrong in the financial crisis and how to fix it. 1997: 182) associated with the world of corporate finance, fits the 'traditional image of the merchant banker as sober, rational and powerful, with the levers of the world financial system secure in his careful hands'. The masculinity at work here is quite classspecific. It is also rooted in the mind/body separation and the subsequent privileging of 'objective' rationality (1997: 184) . According to masculinity theorists, traditional bourgeois masculinities tended to be nationally based, integrated within local patterns of capitalist accumulation and therefore subject to considerable variation, though industrial managers and investment bankers were key expressions in Britain (Connell and Wood 2005: 348) .
Naturalising Gender in Finance
[Insert Table 1 here]
These masculinities are not mutually exclusive, but are rather ideal-types that overlap in numerous ways. Carney, we argue, successfully embodies aspects of both of these masculinities, which in fact operate together as the source of much of his legitimacy as
Governor. This is partly because of the blame placed on the excessively masculinised This apparently points to the fact that 'gung-ho traders in the City of London would be wrong to think that "one of us" is taking over at the BoE' (Alloway and Schäfer 2012) .
Thus the gendered narrative that has been constructed around Mark Carney complicates To be clear, our primary concern here is not the lack of women in finance, striking though this is. Rather, our intention is to draw attention to the ways in which both of these narratives serve to naturalise gender in finance. At the same time, they lead to the depoliticisation of post-crisis financial policymaking by framing the problems of finance as being caused by excesses of a certain form of masculinity. The solution then is not to be found in improved regulation, democratisation, experiment, or a radical reimagining of financial market relationships, but rather in femininity and/or a more 'reasonable' and paternal masculinity. In this way, the crisis is performed as a particular event requiring a ready-made response that ultimately serves to silence other political interventions (Brassett and Clarke 2012: 16) . As Elizabeth Prügl (2012: 23) explains in reference to the discourse about women, while gendered narratives cannot be separated from historical context (i.e. the global financial crisis), they operate as myths that naturalise and depoliticise power relations. While Prügl's analysis focuses on the mythical distinction made between reckless man and responsible woman, which she argues 'provides a new meaning structure that offers insight into the unfamiliar of the crisis', we suggest that the division between reckless and careful man allows for a similar reconstruction of faith in the financial elite. As we argue in the following section, the deeply gendered characteristics attributed to Carney serve to naturalise gender constructions in finance, which in turn can be understood through the lens of distinct depoliticising moves.
The Gendered Depoliticisation of British Central Banking
Drawing from the analysis above, this section accounts for Carney's role in reproducing an ostensibly 'depoliticised' monetary policy environment in the UK. In particular, it draws attention to the specific depoliticising effect of his appointment by investigating the gendered aspects of Carney's place in the remoulding of finance in post-crisis policymaking. Our argument is that the deeply gendered characteristics attributed to (Thompson 1996) . In one of a number of related feuds over monetary policy in the late 1980s, Nigel Lawson encouraged Margaret Thatcher to grant independence to the Bank in order to buy the government credibility and lock-in a 'permanent anti-inflationary force into the system' (Lawson cited in Stephens 1996: 276-277) . Thatcher rejected the proposal, despite the fact that it had been part of her economic manifesto published in 1977, The Right Approach to the Economy, which explicitly noted that control of inflation would be easier if interest rate decisions were 'depoliticized' (Stephens 1996: 276) . Of course, such episodes occurred in the period that Peter Hall (1993: 283) calls one of 'third order change' in British macroeconomic policymaking as Keynesian modes of thinking were replaced with monetarist economic theory. For our discussion the most important aspect of this shift, in general terms, was that the preeminent concern of policymakers shifted from unemployment to inflation (Hall 1993: 284 The narratives of gender in finance outlined above are thus shown to be integral to these depoliticising moves, while in the final section below we go beyond the layered performances of various types of masculinities and femininities, to consider how aspects of central banking, and associated financial governance agendas, might affect men and women differently.
Arena-shifting bourgeois masculinity
In his seminal account of the concept (which appeared in this journal), Burnham (2001: 128 emphasis in original) argues that 'depoliticisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making'. ix Though we take a slightly broader understanding, we refer to this as arena-shifting depoliticisation. The idea of adopting a set of 'credible rules' underwrites the politics of depoliticisation in this regard, whereby the act of depoliticisation involves switching from a 'discretion-based' to a 'rule-based' system that allows governments to 'externalise' responsibility for the imposition of financial discipline (Burnham 2001: 129, 134; see also Gill 2008: 138) .
These arena-shifting dynamics are central to the justification of CBI outlined above, resting on notions of competence, credibility, and the 'myth of neutrality' (Adolph 2013) .
In fact, the job description for the governor role explicitly acknowledged this perceived Contributing to this perceived innate reasonableness, Carney himself claims that his thinking is not motivated by any particular theorist (Giles 2013b ). According to Adolph (2013: 10) , this is to be expected, because central bankers have every reason to feed the 'myth of neutrality' since 'it is always easier to be considered above politics'. Carney (cited in Giles 2013a) has certainly made a number of claims to this effect, typified in his suggestion that he wants 'to achieve an exit in 2018 that is less newsworthy than [his] entrance', which presumably indicates he is looking to adopt a calm, almost 'boring' style of dispassionate and measured policymaking. Ultimately, though, we would argue that it is the 'reasonable man' claim that places Carney at one remove from the messy world of politics and errant private finance. He is rational and reasonable, just like the supposed proper workings of finance in the abstract based on rational economic decision-making free from political interference.
Responsibility-shifting business masculinity
Clearly there are limits to viewing the gendered narrative of Carney purely through the lens of an arena-shifting form of bourgeois masculinity. For one thing, although they tend to downplay their lender-of-last-resort function, central banks were in part blamed for actually enabling the type of business masculinity that supposedly helped fuel the crisis in the first place: the so-called moral hazard problem in which private banks are incentivised to take on more risk safe in the knowledge that the central bank will bail them out (Cooper 2008: 60 295-296). We refer to this as responsibility-shifting depoliticisation. Here it is important to highlight the attribution to Carney the masculinised character traits of strength, confidence, and a certain aggressiveness. As noted, Carney does not simply perform a typical transnational business masculinity, as he also represents bourgeois masculine reasonableness, but in certain regards character traits associated with the former still play an important part in a depoliticising move. Arguably, his position as a former financier essentially helps further entrench the position of monetary policy making as far removed from state governance. As a strong, convicted, and financially-astute leader with an illustrious previous career in private finance, Carney's career trajectory is central to his ability to be trusted with responsibility for the economy. In effect, this again helps shift responsibility away from the political arena.
Let us explain precisely how. In addition to the reasonable man claim above, the way in which Carney is very much an industry insider is crucial to providing the legitimacy he needs to claim appropriate notions of responsibility in his role. While this is not a particularly new development in central banking, Carney's background in finance takes on a distinctly gendered frame, further embellishing the depoliticising move. As one commentator put it, given his history, 'he can mix it up with the big boys' (Masters 2013) . When charm and reason fail, the former quarterback and hockey player can rely on his more business-masculine ferocious side to get his way, 'to fight off shots from all angles' (Masters 2013) . Indeed according to Gordon Nixon (Giles 2013b) , chief executive of the Royal Bank of Canada, in order to force banks to find a way out of Canada's economic woes in 2007-08, Carney had to 'bash heads together'. In essence, this is about being able to engage with testosterone-fuelled finance when necessary. So the fact that he comes from the private banking sector helps to legitimate the idea that responsibility can be left in his hands: if required, Carney has the ability to display those characteristics associated with transnational business masculinity in addition to the traditional bourgeois masculinity that has become desirable again post-crisis.
Politics-shifting: The interplay of bourgeois and business masculinities
Thus far, our accounts of arena-shifting and responsibility-shifting depoliticisation run the risk of reproducing the notion of a separation between a formal realm of politics (i.e.
party government) and an extra-political realm to which decision making and responsibility might be 'shifted' through depoliticisation (in this case, through CBI). Of course, such a separation is deeply problematic, not least in light of one of the foundational contributions of feminist scholarship. To further explicate Carney's role in depoliticising central banking we thus go beyond these accounts. For us, it is useful to highlight the success of Jacques Rancière's work on depoliticisation in this regard as an additional productive understanding for our task at hand. Rancière (2007: 19;  11) argues depoliticisation is not merely the modern act of absolving state responsibility, it actually points to the 'oldest task of politics'; that is, 'the art of suppressing the political'.
Crucially, for Rancière (2007: 11) , politics itself has a 'paradoxical essence': it is the essential tension between depoliticising and repoliticising tendencies. Therefore, to suggest that Carney performs the character traits associated with both bourgeois and business masculinity is to draw attention to a politics-shifting depoliticising move.
As the most complicated depoliticising move, it is important here to understand the interplay between the types of masculinity that Carney embodies. This can be most directly explained in terms of how Carney is successful in performing both sets of character traits as and when he needs. In both cases, though, it comes down to him being perceived as so unlike other men in finance. Carney embodies a certain bourgeois masculinity, so can be considered 'at one remove' from errant finance, while at the same time he embodies enough business masculinity to engage with and play dirty in that same errant finance. Returning to Carney's TSC hearing, this can be illustrated by the fact that MPs were apparently impressed that he was very different from both his predecessor, Mervyn King, and another investment banker that they had previously grilled, Barclays' Bob Diamond. Carney's uniqueness is thus his difference from both Diamond and King; the former displaying far too much business masculinity, the latter displaying the preferable bourgeois masculinity, but lacking that alpha plus.
This contributes to politics-shifting depoliticisation in the following way. Drawing these points together, our claim is that insofar as the formal separation of the Bank of England from party government, and therefore from the influence of politicians and the voting public, is depoliticising and disempowering, so too is the narrative that the economy is best left in the hands of the right sort of man, whether he embodies bourgeois masculinity, business masculinity, or a unique combination of both. In the final section we stress why this is so important by discussing the important distributional questions this obfuscates in Carney's case, and to what effect.
The Gendered Politics of Central Banking
As we have seen, the run up to Carney's appointment was less a debate about what needs to be done in terms of central banking in the UK and more of a debate about 'the right kind of man' to take up the job. This came in the form of glorifying accounts of his personal history, character attributes, and so on. In this final section, we discuss two aspects of British central banking that will be crucial to Carney's stewardship. We focus on these agendas because they are what the Bank outlines as its priorities, thus taking them on their own terms. Our intention is not to provide a simplistic answer to the question of 'what is to be done?' in these areas, but to draw attention to the important distributional questions that the appointment of Carney arguably serves to silence. In turn, these are policies addressing monetary and financial stability.
Monetary Stability
The first strategic priority of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is to maintain price stability, defined by the Government's two per cent target (Bank of England 2013: 5) .
That said, since the onset of the financial crisis, the government has effectively discarded the expectation that the Bank would actually meet this inflation target. Conceived as an extraordinary period of departure from the conventional rules of modern monetary policy, Carney took over at a time when the MPC was committed to an 'exceptionally stimulative stance on monetary policy' (Bank of England 2013) . This included maintaining the Bank rate at an historic low of 0.5 per cent (Chart 1) and the injection of £375billion through the quantitative easing (QE) programme.
[Insert Chart 1 here]
The purchase of hundreds of billions of pounds worth of assets through QE, combined with a number of other programmes designed to support liquidity in various markets, has led to enormous increases in the balance sheet of the Bank of England (Table 2) .
[Insert Table 2 A crucial underpinning of much of this literature relates to the extent to which independent central banks restrain fiscal policy choice (Sakamoto 2008 ). This has important implications for women as a group (and for social welfare more broadly), as the governments may be compelled to address growing budget deficits and financial crises primarily through austerity measures rather than through monetary policy tools.
The UK Government's austerity agenda since 2010, for instance, includes pay freezes for public sector employees, significant welfare spending retrenchment (including housing benefit, disability allowances, and pensioner benefits) and new restrictions on job seekers benefits, all of which have disproportionately negative impacts on women (Symposium 2012). Austerity measures have also led to reductions in funds for services supporting victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse, the majority of whom are women (Walby 2012 : 1).
To be sure, there are instances where inflation targeting benefits those at the bottom of the income scale -which includes many women -and more research is needed to better establish the links between CBI, inflation targets and a range of gender-specific
outcomes. Yet, our aim here is to suggest that there is a notable silence amongst most economists and within official circles regarding the gendered nature of (an ostensibly depoliticised) independent central bank. Looking beyond inflation targeting, a number of questions could be raised about the gender and class biases of QE. For one, the benefits of asset purchases will accrue to those households that hold the most financial assets.
According to a survey commissioned by the Bank, while the median household holds around £1,500 of gross assets, the top 5 percent of households hold an average of £175,000, or what amounts to 40 percent of the financial assets of the household sector as a whole (Bank of England 2012: 10-11 ). Though gender is not accounted for in this study, separate studies have shown that fewer women tend to invest in financial assets than men.
xi While our purpose is not to paint a complete picture of the ways in which the Bank of England, under Carney's leadership, has directly influenced these shifting dynamics, it is to suggest that there are a number of deeply political questions that are foreclosed by its near exclusive focus on price stability. What is more, the portrayal of Carney as we have outlined above does very little to either stimulate or address a debate about meaningful financial reform in light of the crisis. Instead, it continues to support the notion that the primary tasks of the Bank should remain in essence conservative, aiming at minimal system maintenance and adjustment in terms of price stability.
Financial Stability
George Osborne's choice of Carney as Governor of the Bank is closely tied to its new financial stability remit. On announcing his appointment, the Chancellor argued that he (2009) point out, while much work in masculinity studies emphasizes the extent to which hegemonic forms of masculinity legitimise patriarchal rule, it also tends to focus on the actions of particular men. They argue that this creates a tension within masculinity studies, which fails to adequately consider the disjuncture between masculinity as a political ideal (or discourse) and the actual characteristics of groups of men. While we are indeed focused on one particular man, we are not primarily concerned with assessing the extent to which he conforms to the ideal in practice. Rather, the more important point is to emphasise the ways in which the gendered narratives constructed (and enacted) by the media, state representatives, private bankers and others help to naturalise and legitimise first, the on-going dominance of finance by men, second, Mark Carney's place at the head of the Bank of England and third, the policies of this supposedly apolitical institution. viii Women's representation in regulatory reform initiatives post-2008 is notably dire, with women making up only 9% of the UN Stiglitz Commission, while the De Larosiere Report for the European Commission was entirely made up of men (Schuberth and Young 2011: 142) . Davos Woman has not made much of an appearance at the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos either: in 2012, only 17 percent of the 2,500 delegates were women, only 20 percent of those invited to present on panels were women, and the great majority of panels, especially non-specialist panels focused on 'key economic topics' remained dominated by white men (Martinson 2012) . ix See also Burnham (2007: 396) where he later suggests that a 'distinction needs to be drawn between Treasury politicisation, understood as the Treasury gaining ascendancy over the Bank, and Ministerial politicisation, understood in terms of pressure being brought to bear on the Chancellor to alter monetary policy for short-term political gain'.
x It should be noted that the Bank's arrival at this crisis-response framework did not follow a smooth path. Rather, according to the former chancellor, Alistair Darling, it featured a series of misjudgements by Carney's predecessor Mervyn King along the way (Stephens 2011) . While the relationship between Darling and King is known to have been strained based on different opinions on how to respond to the crisis around 2007, Darling in fact accused the former Governor of direct politicking to shore up his position with the incoming Tory-led government, effectively jettisoning the supposed depoliticised position of the Bank at that time (Stephens 2011) . xi See for instance edition=tcm%3A77-51166) . Though the value of these assets is not readily available, the well-documented and significant gender differences in earnings suggest that this would likely reveal important differences in terms of who benefits from QE. xii http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/default.aspx xiii The Coalition Government have essentially continued New Labour's desire for people to become more personally responsible for their consumption needs in old age and this is most clearly visible in the presentation of the housing market as an ideal economic asset which can grow for the purpose of enabling future consumption, which involves the constitution of 'monetary conservatives' (Watson 2008: 287) .  older and generally with seniority  noble-minded patriarchs  association with authority and social conservatism  reflects upper-class position  careful, sober, rational and powerful  loyalty to the heterosexual family, the firm and the nation  emotional distance between men and women  disavowal of the body  least conscious performance of masculinity  linked to 'Englishness' *These ideal types have been developed by a number of theorists, including Connell (1995; 1998) , Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) , Connell and Wood (2005) , Hooper (2000; and McDowell (1997; .
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